Soon after the Americans arrived in Iraq, Bremer published two orders. The first disbanded the
Baath Party that had dominated Iraq for five decades and banned the upper
ranks of the Baathists from holding management positions in government or
industry.
The Baath Party was a typical product of a totalitarian state. It was a mass organization with almost two million members, most of whom were required to join the party to work in the government or practice a profession. The upper ranks of the Baath Party contained many of the essential personnel needed to run the infrastructure and economy, and Bremer’s order summarily threw them out of work.
The next order formally disbanded the Iraqi army. At the stroke of a pen, 400,000 armed Iraqi men were thrown out of work and faced a bleak future.
The two orders ignited the insurgency. The ban on employing former Baath party members was a signal that there was no place in a new Iraq for former supporters of Saddam Hussein. The Iraqi army had been a top-heavy force with tens of thousands of officers, another typical product of a totalitarian state. Some were staunch supporters of Saddam Hussein, but most had joined the army and the Baath Party simply to have a career. The army officers, many of whom had been ready to work with the American occupiers, were now completely alienated.
Moreover, Iraq was awash in weapons and munitions, and there was a large and angry officer corps who knew how to use them. With the former officers and the now-suppressed Baath Party political network, it was easy work for the now-huge number of discontented Iraqis to organize insurgent groups.
Four days after the CPA order that disbanded the Iraqi army and Baath Party was announced, the first insurgent bombs went off in the city of Falluja, a Sunni and Baathist stronghold. The order disbanding the Iraqi army was one of the greatest strategic mistakes of the Bush administration.
The Iraqi insurgency was originally motivated by nationalist and ethnic considerations. The vast majority of insurgents were disaffected Sunnis, who began a campaign of harassment and terrorism against the Coalition Forces. Even more disturbing, the insurgents began assassinating Iraqis who were cooperating with the Coalition forces and trying to form a new, democratic Iraqi government
As the insurgency began, the Shiites used their new freedom to organize political parties. Under the conditions of continuing crime and disorder the parties naturally formed militias, at first simply to protect their neighborhoods.
Since Sunnis were viewed as the main threat to his people, his militia, called the Madhi Army, began a systematic program of forcing Sunnis out of ethnically mixed neighborhoods and seizing Sunni property for distribution among his supporters.
Within weeks of the fall of Saddam, Americans were facing an Iraqi political system that included some moderate parties, but also some very religious parties, and some that openly advocated violence against the Sunnis. All the ingredients for a civil war were in place in 2003—with the U.S. forces in the middle. Since the differences between the parties were so extreme, Iraqi leaders were forced to build a weak government.
Any regard for professional competence was disregarded. Since the ministries were split along party and ethnic lines, and mistrusted each other, each ministry raised its own security force. The cooperation between the many security forces was poor to nonexistent. In contrast, insurgent groups were often better at working together than the agencies of the new Iraqi government. As early as summer 2003, the Sunnis had produced at least eight groups fighting the Americans and Shiites. Built on local or religious loyalties, insurgent groups shared information and cooperated tactically against the Coalition forces and Iraqi security forces.
The insurgency flourished in the central part of Iraq, in the four provinces that included the majority of the Sunni population. From 2003 to 2005, U.S. forces carried out sweep-and-clear operations to drive the insurgents out of towns, but there was no pacification effort to follow the military operations. The Iraqi government was unable to establish a presence after the U.S. troops drove out insurgent bands. So as soon as the U.S. troops cleared an area, the insurgents came right back in.
(Corum, James. Bad Strategies. pp.208-212)
The Baath Party was a typical product of a totalitarian state. It was a mass organization with almost two million members, most of whom were required to join the party to work in the government or practice a profession. The upper ranks of the Baath Party contained many of the essential personnel needed to run the infrastructure and economy, and Bremer’s order summarily threw them out of work.
The next order formally disbanded the Iraqi army. At the stroke of a pen, 400,000 armed Iraqi men were thrown out of work and faced a bleak future.
The two orders ignited the insurgency. The ban on employing former Baath party members was a signal that there was no place in a new Iraq for former supporters of Saddam Hussein. The Iraqi army had been a top-heavy force with tens of thousands of officers, another typical product of a totalitarian state. Some were staunch supporters of Saddam Hussein, but most had joined the army and the Baath Party simply to have a career. The army officers, many of whom had been ready to work with the American occupiers, were now completely alienated.
Moreover, Iraq was awash in weapons and munitions, and there was a large and angry officer corps who knew how to use them. With the former officers and the now-suppressed Baath Party political network, it was easy work for the now-huge number of discontented Iraqis to organize insurgent groups.
Four days after the CPA order that disbanded the Iraqi army and Baath Party was announced, the first insurgent bombs went off in the city of Falluja, a Sunni and Baathist stronghold. The order disbanding the Iraqi army was one of the greatest strategic mistakes of the Bush administration.
The Iraqi insurgency was originally motivated by nationalist and ethnic considerations. The vast majority of insurgents were disaffected Sunnis, who began a campaign of harassment and terrorism against the Coalition Forces. Even more disturbing, the insurgents began assassinating Iraqis who were cooperating with the Coalition forces and trying to form a new, democratic Iraqi government
As the insurgency began, the Shiites used their new freedom to organize political parties. Under the conditions of continuing crime and disorder the parties naturally formed militias, at first simply to protect their neighborhoods.
Since Sunnis were viewed as the main threat to his people, his militia, called the Madhi Army, began a systematic program of forcing Sunnis out of ethnically mixed neighborhoods and seizing Sunni property for distribution among his supporters.
Within weeks of the fall of Saddam, Americans were facing an Iraqi political system that included some moderate parties, but also some very religious parties, and some that openly advocated violence against the Sunnis. All the ingredients for a civil war were in place in 2003—with the U.S. forces in the middle. Since the differences between the parties were so extreme, Iraqi leaders were forced to build a weak government.
Any regard for professional competence was disregarded. Since the ministries were split along party and ethnic lines, and mistrusted each other, each ministry raised its own security force. The cooperation between the many security forces was poor to nonexistent. In contrast, insurgent groups were often better at working together than the agencies of the new Iraqi government. As early as summer 2003, the Sunnis had produced at least eight groups fighting the Americans and Shiites. Built on local or religious loyalties, insurgent groups shared information and cooperated tactically against the Coalition forces and Iraqi security forces.
The insurgency flourished in the central part of Iraq, in the four provinces that included the majority of the Sunni population. From 2003 to 2005, U.S. forces carried out sweep-and-clear operations to drive the insurgents out of towns, but there was no pacification effort to follow the military operations. The Iraqi government was unable to establish a presence after the U.S. troops drove out insurgent bands. So as soon as the U.S. troops cleared an area, the insurgents came right back in.
(Corum, James. Bad Strategies. pp.208-212)
